



# INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE: LIBERIA

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

- TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... 2**
- ACRONYMS ..... 3**
- METHODOLOGY ..... 5**
- INTRODUCTION..... 6**
- PART I: AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MAP..... 7**
- PART II: CAPACITY OF FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE..... 9**
- POLICY ELEMENT 1: THE GUIDING POLICY FRAMEWORK ..... 9**
  - Overview ..... 9
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 10
  - Conclusions ..... 11
  - Recommendations..... 11
- POLICY ELEMENT 2: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION ..... 13**
  - Overview ..... 13
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 14
  - Conclusions ..... 16
  - Recommendations..... 16
- POLICY ELEMENT 3: INCLUSIVITY AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION ..... 17**
  - Overview ..... 17
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 18
  - Conclusions ..... 19
  - Recommendations..... 20
- POLICY ELEMENT 4: EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS..... 21**
  - Overview ..... 21
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 22
  - Conclusions ..... 23
  - Recommendations..... 24
- POLICY ELEMENT 5: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION..... 25**
  - Overview ..... 25
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 26
  - Conclusions ..... 28
  - Recommendations..... 28
- POLICY ELEMENT 6: MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY ..... 29**
  - Overview ..... 29
  - Capacity for Policy Change Indicators..... 30
  - Conclusions ..... 31
  - Recommendations..... 31
- CONCLUSION ..... 32**
- ANNEX: CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS ..... 33**

## ACRONYMS

<b>ACC</b>	Agricultural Coordination Committee
<b>ACO</b>	Agricultural County Office
<b>ADO</b>	Agricultural District Office
<b>ADWG</b>	Agriculture Donor Working Group
<b>AfT</b>	Agenda for Transformation
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>BFS</b>	Bureau for Food Security
<b>CAADP</b>	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
<b>CAAS-LIB</b>	Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector of Liberia
<b>CARI</b>	Central Agricultural Research Institute
<b>CPI</b>	Consumer Price Index
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FAPS</b>	Food and Agriculture Policy and Strategy
<b>FED</b>	USAID's Food and Enterprise Development Program
<b>FSNP</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Program
<b>FSNTC</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee
<b>FUN</b>	Farmers Union Network
<b>GAFFSP</b>	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GOL</b>	Government of Liberia
<b>IFC</b>	International Financial Corporation
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IFMIS</b>	Integrated Financial Management System
<b>IITA</b>	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>LASIP</b>	Liberia Agriculture Sector Investment Program
<b>LBBF</b>	Liberia Better Business Forum
<b>LDA</b>	Liberia Development Alliance
<b>LIBA</b>	Liberia Business Associations
<b>LISGIS</b>	Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>M &amp; E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation

<b>MOA</b>	Ministry of Agriculture
<b>MOCI</b>	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
<b>MOF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>NDI</b>	National Democratic Institute
<b>NFSNS</b>	National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>PDU</b>	Program Delivery Unit
<b>PFMRAF</b>	Public Financial Management Rapid Assessment Framework
<b>PMU</b>	Program Management Unit
<b>PRS</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy
<b>RPAL</b>	Rubber Planters Association of Liberia
<b>SAKSS</b>	Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
<b>SCO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>SDI</b>	Sustainable Development Institute
<b>TASMOA</b>	Technical Assistance Service Support of the MOA
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USAID-GEMS</b>	USAID/Liberia Governance and Economic Management Support Project
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Program

## METHODOLOGY

The path and trajectory of policy change is a complex, non-linear process that is often unique to a particular country. While no two countries share precisely the same process, effective policy changes can and do share similar features; namely, predictable, transparent, inclusive, and evidence-based policy-making. The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Bureau for Food Security (BFS) is emphasizing the need for an understanding of the Institutional Architecture for Food Security Policy Change.<sup>1</sup>

Institutional Architecture provides a framework for analyzing a country's capacity to undertake food security change.<sup>2</sup> This is accomplished by identifying implementation barriers, designing policy options, and coordinating actions across public and private institutions. This assessment examines the components of a policy-making process; providing USAID, local policymakers, and other key stakeholders with information on possible constraints that could stymie effective policy change. This work will help inform USAID as it explores new approaches for technical assistance to improve the capacity and performance of the policy change process.

### Part I: Mapping of Institutional Architecture for Policy Change

The first part in this process maps out the key systems, processes, and relationships that influence food security policy development. This involves identifying and mapping: the guiding policy framework, the key institutions that hold primary responsibility for implementation, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms; private and civil society organizations, as well as think tanks and research organizations, that impact and influence the food security policy change process.

### Part II: Capacity of Food Security Policy Change

The second part of this assessment involves an analysis of a country's capacity to undertake transparent, inclusive, predictable, and evidence-based policy change. The country is examined through the following six components of the policy formation process to determine its 'readiness for policy change':

- Policy Element 1: Guiding Policy Framework
- Policy Element 2: Policy Development and Coordination
- Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation
- Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis
- Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation
- Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability

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Each of these components is analyzed through a set of indicators that determine the capacity and effectiveness of the overall policy change process. Each indicator is assessed using a three-tier rating system, which highlights the level of attention needed to improve the effectiveness of the component. A *Green* rating means the component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention is not required. A *Yellow* rating means that the conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required. A *Red* rating means that significant attention is needed to ensure the component is achieved. Indicators will be accompanied with a

<sup>1</sup>Institutional Architecture is defined as the set of partner-country procedures and processes for data collection and analysis, consultation and dialogue, policy proposal, feedback, approval, implementation, and enforcement.

<sup>2</sup> Food Security is defined as "when all people at all times have access to safe and sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. There are four main components: availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability of food."

narrative analysis of key gaps and constraints to the policy change process. Recommendations for future actions follow each of the Policy Elements.

### Part III: Summary Conclusions

The third part draws conclusions based upon the above set of findings.

## INTRODUCTION

Decades of mismanagement and fourteen years of civil war ending in 2003 destroyed Liberia's economy and left the country in ruins. The infrastructure was destroyed or had deteriorated beyond use, and the war devastated Liberia's human and institutional capacity. The agricultural sector was deeply damaged during its years of conflict. The years since the war have been focused on stabilizing and unifying the country, and rebuilding the physical infrastructure and human capacity. However, there is still a long road to recovery as the educational level, especially for women is low, youth unemployment is high and the provision of public services, especially in rural areas is still limited and underdeveloped. Liberia is highly aid dependent and development assistance accounts for significantly more than Government of Liberia (GOL) spending.<sup>3</sup>

Agriculture accounts for about one third of the GDP, with rice being the most important crop (85% of households produce it)<sup>4</sup> Seventy percent of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood. One out of five Liberians are food insecure and an additional one out of three are vulnerable to food insecurity.<sup>5</sup> The level of productivity is low, post-harvest losses very high, value chain synergies highly undeveloped and access to markets very challenging. However, unlike most other places in Sub-Saharan Africa, land and water resources are abundant and there is ample potential for significant expansion of agriculture production. There are an estimated 600,000 hectares of irrigable land, but less than 5% is under permanent cultivation and only 1% is irrigated.<sup>6</sup> Commercial agriculture is almost exclusively plantation estates of rubber, palm oil, cocoa and coffee, primarily produced for export, and sold with no or little value addition. To quickly improve the economy and obtain funds to stabilize the country after the war, widely criticized international concession agreements of 30 percent of the country's land were signed. Besides the concessions and the plantations, little private investment has been made into agriculture. The Livestock sector was virtually decimated by the civil war and the fishery sector is undeveloped.

Agricultural policy has traditionally been focused on the concessions. However, in the last 5 years, Liberia has developed a new policy framework broadening the focus to food security by signing on to the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) process. However, the national budget for agriculture is still less than 3% of the total budget; hence far from the 10% goal stated in the CAADP documents. The government has very limited capacity and resources to implement the policies and reach of the government in the rural areas is inadequate. Hence, agricultural support programs is almost exclusively funded and implemented by donor projects, with the degree of leadership and priority setting from the government being mixed.

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
<sup>3</sup> In 2010, just the United States bilateral assistance was equivalent of the GOL budget. See, Feed the Future 2011-2015 Multiyear Strategy, 2011.



<sup>4</sup> FAO Country Profile 2012, Liberia. [www.fao.org](http://www.fao.org)

<sup>5</sup> The Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey 2012

<sup>6</sup> Food and Agriculture Policy and Strategy (FAPS) 2008, Agenda for Transformation (2012).

# PART I: AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MAP





# PART II: CAPACITY OF FOOD SECURITY POLICY CHANGE

## POLICY ELEMENT I: THE GUIDING POLICY FRAMEWORK

*The guiding policy framework for agriculture and food security is sound; but there is a need to prioritize goals and activities. It is of importance to finalize a number of sector specific or technical policies and strategies. Considering the limited resources there are, it is of utter importance for the government to set a clear and realistic vision of how priority goals can be reached.*

### OVERVIEW

Liberia has developed a comprehensive framework of policies for agriculture and food security. The various policies reiterate the important role agriculture plays and they are primarily complementing each other. The Government of Liberia (GOL) views the agricultural sector as a central driver for economic development, although it has not been named one of the GoL's top five priority areas. However, the lack of a functioning high level steering committee prioritizing initiatives, guiding the development of new policies and tracking the progress of ongoing activities and programs causes these policies to be less effective. Instead, the lack of a clear political direction and ownership of how these documents should be implemented and prioritized have rendered these well-crafted policy documents less useful.

During the transitional government and the first couple of years of the Ellen Johnson Sirleaf administration, a host of new policy documents were developed to guide the country's recovery and path towards a more inclusive economic development. The **National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy** (NFSNS) and the **Food and Agriculture Policy and Strategy** (FAPS) were both developed within the broader context of the country's first post-war **Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy** (PRS). Urged by the donors to clearly articulate the country's goals and priorities for the agricultural sector, Liberia embarked on the **Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program** (CAADP) process. Signed in 2009, the government and the donor community confirmed their commitment to support the CAADP compact. The five year (2011-2015) roadmap to implement the CAADP commitments is articulated in the **Liberia Agricultural Sector Investment Program** (LASIP). LASIP outlines four broad programs; food and nutrition security, competitive value chains and market linkages, institutional development, and land and water development, as well as a fifth program for cross-cutting issues including gender. The programs are said to be prioritized (food and nutrition being the top priority) and broken into sub-programs. However, what the priorities are have not been reiterated or stressed in any other steering documents or discussions. The LASIP document lays out a decision-making structure for implementation and there are cost estimates for implementing the programs and sub-programs as well as a gap funding analysis. However, important parts of the decision-making structure are not functioning and the progress to meet the goals is not tracked in any systematic fashion. Nine more specific policies or strategies, including the National Seed Policy, the National Policy for Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services, the National Livestock Policy and the National Fishery Policy are at various stages of development.

Launched in 2012, **Liberia Rising 2030** is the country's long term vision for achieving middle income status by 2030. The **Agenda for Transformation** (AfT) is Liberia's five year poverty reduction strategy (2012-2017). AfT was developed in tandem with Liberia Rising 2030 and is envisioned to be the first steps

towards the long term vision. Considering Liberia's recent history, the strategy stresses the importance of an inclusive economic development to allow a great proportion of the population to share in the growth. By rebuilding the decimated infrastructure and taking steps towards improving the business climate, the GOL seeks to address the challenge of stimulating income generating activities outside of the concessions and the public sector. The AFT is structured around 5 pillars<sup>7</sup>, the second pillar is "economic transformation" which includes private sector development and increased agricultural production and greater food security. The MOA is the designated agent of change in the agricultural sector to provide technical assistance and encourage the formation of small-holder cooperatives, but considering the Ministry's weak institutional and human capacity and the limited presence in the counties, the provision of such services are not being met.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework

*Status: Yellow*

The policy framework for the agricultural sector is broadly consistent and conveys that food security is a priority. However, without a higher level steering committee setting an agenda for what the priorities are on a regular basis, it becomes less clear what the GOL's priorities are. Existing policy documents outline a very wide variety of priorities, but the relationships among them aren't clear. Instead, any donor funded program that involves the agricultural sector is considered to be in line with the broadly defined policy priorities, and there remains a need for a steering committee to continue focus on identified priorities

### b. Predictability and Transparency of the Policy-Making Process

*Status: Yellow*

The development of the guiding policy documents including the Agenda for Transformation and LASIP were developed in a transparent manner with several rounds of consultation and validation. However, a number of more specific policies and strategies have been in the pipeline for several years without much advancement. The MOA is not consistently following through and driving the process. However, with some donor support, a matrix was recently developed to review the progress of ongoing policy proposals. The matrix was presented by the MOA at an Inter-Ministerial meeting in December 2013 to highlight what actions are still required to pass the policies.

### c. Clear and Functional Legislative System

*Status: Yellow*

The vast majority of legislation originates from, and is drafted by the Executive branch. Policies are approved by Parliament, however strategies are not. Some bills are being debated, the Senate and the House of Representatives hold few hearings. Both the Senate and the House have committees on agricultural and forestry, but the committee in Senate is rather passive, while the House committee is more active and knowledgeable. The effects of a recent legislative strengthening program have had mixed results. For instance, the implementation of a legislative tracking system is working in the House but the Senate stopped using it and bills are getting lost. Some of the activities under the program such as a legislative drafting service and the construction

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<sup>7</sup> Pillar I - Peace, Justice, Security and Rule of Law; Pillar II - Economic Transformation; Pillar III - Human Development and Pillar IV - Governance and Public Institutions. Pillar V covers cross cutting issues such as gender, youth, disability, employment and the environment.

of a website have not been adopted as the financial disbursement structure of the legislature does not encourage universal internet connectivity for the legislature.<sup>8</sup>

d. Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process/Judicial Framework

*Status: Red*

There is a lack of trust in the judicial system due to widespread corrupt practices and limited independence from other branches of the government. The Judges and clerks have refused to comply with an executive order to declare assets to the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission arguing the order does not apply to the Judiciary. Although some observers are of the opinion that the Judiciary is improving, recent high profile cases challenge these statements. The Supreme Court upheld recently a libel suit against a newspaper engaged in investigative journalism of the MOA and the Port Authorities, which calls the Judiciary's commitment to the freedom of the press, transparency and a democratic, open society into question.

e. Clearly Defined Institutional Responsibilities

*Status: Yellow*

The institutional responsibilities are clearly defined, but limited capacity and human resources leads to inconsistencies in its application. For instance, the **Senate Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry** is supposed to oversee the MoA's progress in implementing the LASIP. However, the committee exercises very little oversight and does not have the means to independently verify whether projects and programs are being implemented in the counties.

## CONCLUSIONS

While the steering policy documents for the sector are adequate and have a level of details that enables the policies to be put into action, the lack of a clear order of priorities is diluting the policy documents' effectiveness. There is a lack of ownership from the GOL to drive and follow through in the policy process, and several important policies and strategies have stalled, such as many of the sector specific policies apart from rice and cassava. There is a system in place for approving policies, but the political disconnect between the executive branch and the legislature is not favorable for the policy process to work. As a result, a number of policies have not been brought before the legislature for debate and approval. The executive branch is stronger than the legislature and most legislation is introduced by the executive branch. The legislature plays a limited role in policy making and is often unaware of developments taking place in the executive branch of government.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Prioritize the objectives and the activities under LASIP.** With the five different programs and the numerous activities, the LASIP lacks a focus. There is a need to prioritize the goals and the activities to reflect the budgetary realities of the country.
2. **Strengthen the legislature's capacity to engage in food security policy change.** While previous activities to strengthen the legislature have been met with limited engagement, ownership or logistical challenges, the new leadership of the House of Representatives' Committee on Agriculture and Forestry is demonstrating a new level of engagement. With some support, this

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<sup>8</sup> A number of important policies, including the Food and Agriculture Policy and Strategy (FAPS) from 2008 have not been submitted to the legislature for approval. The document "Draft Policy Issues for Discussion at the third Inter-Ministerial/Agency Meeting for 17 December 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia" outlines a full list of policy documents that still require actions to be completed.

engagement could be leveraged to better involve the legislature in food security policy making. For example, the legislature's role is to supervise implementation and verify that ministries are implementing legislation. However, the body currently does very little fact finding and acknowledge their own lack of capacity in this area in terms of manpower and resources. A more systematic approach could still improve results in this area even in the context of scarce resources.

## POLICY ELEMENT 2: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION

*The absence of a functioning high level steering committee to guide the country in strategic planning, coordination, and priority setting is hampering the development of the sector. The GOL lacks ownership in driving and developing new policy proposals, but the process is, to a large extent, led by the donor community.*

### OVERVIEW

The **Ministry of Agriculture** (MOA) holds the primary responsibility for the development, coordination and implementation of policies and strategies for the agricultural sector. Other relevant ministries and agencies for developing and implementing food security policies include the **Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy**, **Ministry of Commerce and Industry** (MOCI), **Ministry of Finance**, the **Cooperative Development Agency**, the **Land Commission**, the **Forestry Development Authority**, the **Environmental Protection Agency**, the **National Bureau of Concessions**, the **National Investment Commission** and **Parliament**.

However, MOA's capacity to exercise its mandate to formulate policies, and plan, coordinate and monitor implementation of programs and projects is very low. The MOA is divided into four departments; *Planning and Development* (including monitoring and evaluations, the Program Management Unit and agricultural coordination); *Administration*; *Technical Services* (including the **Bureau of National Fisheries**, crop resources, animal resources and the **Central Agricultural Research Institute-CARI**); and *Extension services*. The **Department for Planning and Development** is supposed to provide policy advice, conduct strategic planning, monitor and evaluate program performance, lead the collection of agricultural statistics, coordinate activities and ensure that development assistance to the sector is consistent with the guiding policy documents. However, there is limited staff and resources, inadequate programmatic and budgetary planning and considerable deficiencies in the administrative system.<sup>9</sup> As a result, several of these functions are either not performed or only partially preformed.

The **Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee** was created during the formulation of the FAPS (2008) and reconfirmed in LASIP (2010) as the country's highest sector-level decision making body. The Committee should be chaired by the MOA and include the Ministry of Finance and other line ministries, development partners as well as the private sector and the cooperative movement. However, the Committee has not met in the last two years. The acute absence of this high-level committee has created a vacuum where it is unclear what the Ministry's top priorities are, the coordination of activities is sporadic and strategic planning is lacking.

Policy formulation is heavily driven by **donor** funding. A number of sector strategies have recently been developed with the support of technical assistance from donor funded projects. The National Rice Development Strategy, the National Cassava Strategy, the National Cocoa Development Strategy and the Strategy for Mainstreaming Gender were completed in the last two years, while another nine policies and strategies are still at various stages of development. While the need to develop these policies and strategies has been identified by the MOA, the process has been driven by donor programs. The MOA demonstrates insufficient ownership of the policy development process and doesn't designate one person to be responsible to drive and follow through with the process. While the Minister of Agriculture is

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<sup>9</sup> In 2013, USAID commissioned two assessments of the administrative capacity of the MOA: Public Financial Management Rapid Assessment Framework (PFMRAF) Review of the Ministry of Agriculture, 2013 [Draft], and USAID/Liberia Governance and Economic Management Support Project (USAID-GEMS) Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) Institutional Assessment Report and Capacity Development Plan, 2013.

praised for her knowledge and extensive experience in the sector, the Ministry's decision making process is very top heavy. The limited delegation of decision making power slows down the development of policies and programs considerably. For instance, the National Seed Policy has been in development for several years, with several holding periods. The USAID's Food and Enterprise Development Program (FED) is engaging a consultant to draft the policy into an Act so that it finally can be submitted to the legislature.

It should be noted that while IA looks across institutions and policy areas, the situation for land policy making is a bit better compared to other issue areas. Generally, the institutional architecture in this policy area is more advanced than for agriculture more broadly, given the high priority GOL has given land, robust donor investment, and the 2009 creation of the Land Commission, which is mandated to propose policy reforms. This institution specifically would score better on some of the stated indicators than the institutional environment does as a whole, most notably in the areas of policy development and coordination, inclusivity and stakeholder consultation, evidence based analysis and policy implementation.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. Approved Food Security Strategy/Investment Plan

*Status: Yellow* Building upon the FAPS and the FSNS, the LASIP sets out an overarching vision and strategy for agricultural development and food security for the country. However, greater clarity on what the priorities are is needed. The policy outlines the role of the government, as well as development partners, civil society and the private sector.

### b. Predictable Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed

*Status: Red*

While the LASIP identifies specific policy objectives, these objectives need to be prioritized and reinforced in policy discussions and further elaborated in subsequent more specific policies and strategies. While several such policies have already been developed and others are in the pipeline, it remains unclear what the priority areas are.

### c. Annual Work Plan

*Status: Red*

There is no annual work plan for the agricultural sector identifying activities and their objective in advancing the LASIP or other policies. Acknowledging that it was a bit late, the MOA's Department of Planning and Development said during the assessment visit in January 2014 that they were working on a work plan for 2014 focusing on agricultural coordination, food security and nutrition and strengthened monitoring and evaluation. However, the draft work plan was not shared with the assessment team. No work plan was in place last year. The adoption of a work plan is critical, but the government needs to articulate what the priorities are, so that the work plan can reflect those priorities. .

### d. Functioning Coordination Process

*Status: Red*

The absence of a functioning high level decision-making body (the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee) to prioritize, develop and coordinate food security programs and policies is hampering the government's ability to lead and focus on key activities to advance the LASIP objectives and the country's CAADP commitments. While there are other coordination bodies, including the **Agriculture Donors Working Group (ADWG)**, the **Liberia Development Alliance's Agricultural sector working group**, the **Agriculture Coordination Committee (ACC)** and the **Program Management Unit's (PMU)** steering committee, these

groups are either more technical or without regular participation of higher level decision makers. Therefore, these groups have not been successful or do not have the mandate to set and advance the policy agenda.

e. Secretariat/Administrative Support Function

*Status: Yellow*

As the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee (FSNTC) doesn't meet, no support function exists for the forum. However, the NFSNS foresees the MoA's **Food Security and Nutrition Program (FSNP)** to be the committee's secretariat. Although the FSNP is currently a unit under the Department of Planning and Development rather than an autonomous unit as foreseen in the NFSNS, it could exercise the role of a secretariat if the Committee became active again.

f. Technical Capacity

*Status: Yellow*

There is a monthly meeting of the **Agriculture Coordination Committee** working group (ACC) comprised of actors from across the agricultural sector. There are also nine **Technical Agricultural Coordination Committee** working groups (ACC), chaired by the MOA. The technical working groups are organized by sector<sup>10</sup> and include members from the private sector, donor projects and the civil society. Some of the technical ACCs are active (including cocoa and rice) and meet on a monthly basis, while other ACCs are struggling or not meeting. The more active working groups are those where a technical expert at the MOA has stepped up to lead the group and it is a sector which has donor funded projects (and hence there are more money for activities). However, there is a need from the leadership of the MOA to ensure that the Ministry's technical experts take the responsibility and lead their sector group. The ACC exists also on the county level. The level of activities varies a lot between counties and MOA finds that the logistical constraints of transportation and communication makes it hard to communicate and receive reports from the county agricultural coordinators.

g. Political Support and Approval

*Status: Yellow*

Although agricultural development is a stated priority for Liberia, the President has also been very clear that her administration's priorities are to improve the dire state of infrastructure and electricity in the country. Considering the very high post-harvest losses and the considerable challenges of getting products to the market, improved infrastructure, energy and post-harvest handling are key to develop the weak agricultural markets. Thus, the President's office is engaging in the development of agriculture policies to a very limited extent, but is deferring agriculture policy discussions to the Minister of Agriculture.

h. Engagement of Parliament/Legislative Body

*Status: Yellow*

Legislation originates primarily from the executive branch, while the legislature is rarely sponsoring the development of legal change. Both chambers of the legislature have a standing committee on agriculture and forestry. Because of the chairperson's personal dedication, knowledge and experience in agriculture, the House committee is rather active with regular meetings, connecting with the Farmer Union Network (which was formed by the committee's

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<sup>10</sup> The ACC working groups are: Cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, rice, cassava, livestock, peri-urban vegetables and fishery. aquaculture.

chairperson) and even undertaking some fact finding missions to the nearby counties. However, the Senate's committee does not have the same expertise and dedication; they meet on an ad hoc basis and describe their work as not very proactive. The committees have very little institutional structure and support; the level of engagement is purely dependent on who is chairing the committee.

## CONCLUSIONS

There is no clear structure in place for developing and advancing policies and strategies. The absence of a higher level, intergovernmental steering committee (the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee) has led to a vacuum where neither the government nor the donor community, the private sector or the civil society have a clear understanding of what the country's priorities are for food security. Although coordination and information sharing on a technical level is taking place to a certain degree within certain sectors, the lack of a focused direction for policy development and implementation priorities are hampering the advancement of the sector.

The MOA has serious financial and human resources constraints. However, these constraints could be mitigated if there was a clear and realistic annual work plan for what the Ministry set out to accomplish and a strategy was put in place for communicating with the counties and districts. Due to the existing financial, personnel and organizational constraints as well as the absence of a vision for the sector, the MOA is not driving the policy process. Instead, policy processes are advanced by the donor community and donor funded projects which are bringing ministries, agencies and stakeholders together for discussions, and financing consultants to research, synthesize and develop policy proposals. An organizational structure with a clearer line of delegation and decision-making power and better defined areas of responsibilities for the staff could encourage greater ownership and ability to lead the policy change process.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Support the revival of the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee.**  
Continue to raise the importance of reviving the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee and ensure that the meetings are held regularly. The Committee needs to be championed by the MOA and include the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Finance and other line Ministries, as well as high level donor, civil society and private sector representatives, as foreseen in the LASIP. Functioning coordination in the agricultural sector is taking place in neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Ghana. A closer look at the health sector in Liberia, where the Ministry of Health has demonstrated an assertive leadership in articulating priorities and coordinate activities is also recommended.
2. **Continue to engage the MOA in a dialogue to review the administrative and decision making structure** within the Ministry to enable greater ownership of specific policy initiatives and mitigate the current delays in advancing policy development.

## POLICY ELEMENT 3: INCLUSIVITY AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION

Polices are developed with the participation of stakeholders, but many perceive the dialogue around implementation to be one-sided which does not yield much results. The civil society is weak, while parts of the private sector are better organized.

### OVERVIEW

The civil society sector (CSO) in Liberia is young and still weak. The sector is slowly evolving as the country is shifting from relief work to development. In the last couple of years, civil society has gained some inroads into stakeholder consultation forums, but there is inadequate depth, capacity and expertise in the civil society community to fully engage in policy formulations. Very few CSOs with a national presence focus on agriculture and food security. The CSOs are almost exclusively funded by external donor projects. Although not unique to Liberia, the preoccupation of chasing grant opportunities makes it difficult for CSOs to be strategic in their work. There are serious human resource constraints in the whole Liberian society. Talented and qualified personnel are recruited by the government, the UN or other donor funded programs and projects with more secure funding, and it is therefore challenging to find dedicated activists with the right skillset to engage in policy change.

There are several recently started CSO networks including the **Poverty Reduction Strategy Tracking Network** and the **National Civil Society Council of Liberia**, but these networks tend to be operated by one or a handful of people and are difficult to sustain when funding dries up. There are also a number of civil society organization that are implementing training and other development programs, such as **Women Empowerment 4 Self Employment**, but their engagement in advocacy work is limited.

However, there are exceptions and there are some driven and talented advocates including **Sustainable Development Institute (SDI)**. A Liberian organization with multiple international partner organizations, SDI advocates for forest management, land protection and community engagement in managing concession agreements, notably palm oil concessions. Scrutinizing concession agreements and concession holders have been an area where DSI, **Green Advocates** and the Liberian chapter of the watchdog **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)** have effectively researched and publicized how the lack of transparency, favoritism and corrupt practices were involved in awarding concession agreements.

In 2013, SDI and the **Farmers Union Network (FUN)** organized a two day, well-attended agricultural dialogue event leading up to the Maputo +10 review conference (taking stock of CAADP commitments) held in Liberia a few months later. FUN, founded by the chairperson of the House of Representatives' agricultural and forestry committee, is expanding its activities from project implementation to advocacy. With funding from IFAD and the EU, FUN is currently undertaking a national consultation of its base to develop a strategic plan. FUN participates in national and regional agricultural coordination committee (ACC) meetings and is making inroads to a number of other coordination and stakeholder groups. Although the FUN is just starting to engage in advocacy, it has the potential to be a voice for farmers. However, smaller groups have voiced concern that FUN is getting to be the only voice to represent the country's farming community.

The agri-business community in Liberia is made up of smaller scale farmers and the larger international rubber and palm oil concessions, but little in between and still very few are involved in processing. There is an underdeveloped ecosystem of value chain actors, which includes banks, transport and logistics providers, but the lack of medium-size businesses means they tend to serve small farmers and in a relatively disorganized way. The two sizes of business (small, often individual farmers and very large agribusinesses) have vastly different challenges and needs, and different abilities to access and gain the ear of the

government. The **Chamber of Commerce**, represents the business community in a number of stakeholder meetings, and have been successful at advocating for their member's position on a number of issues including labor laws and clamping down on rubber theft. However, the Chamber of Commerce could be more effective if it could overcome some of its differences and coordinate its efforts with other business groupings such as the **Liberia Business Associations (LIBA)**. Although the **Liberia's Women Chamber of Commerce** participates in a number of stakeholder forums, the association carries out very little activities and has poor communication with its membership base. One organization which includes small holders, large holders and concessions is the **Rubber Planters Association of Liberia (RPAL)**. RPAL has been able to negotiate the different interests of its diverse group of members and takes an active role in policy advocacy and development, notably the development of the national rubber strategy. The International Financial Corporation (IFC) supports the **Liberia Better Business Forum (LBBF)**, a public-private dialogue platform to engage the government and stakeholders in business enabling environment reforms. However, the MOA is not represented on the LBBF. The **Liberia Marketing Association** represents traders at its markets, but operates in such a manner that often excludes traders from participating.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. Inclusive Participation within the Policy Coordination Management Entity

*Status: Red*

As the country's high level coordination entity, the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee is not functioning, there is a serious gap in participation from key government ministries beyond the MOA and non-government actors in coordinating activities and priorities for the sector. Although there are other forums for coordination and consultation with donors (ADWG) and the private sector (ACC), the absence of a committee that brings together government and non-government actors to establish a road map for where the sector is going, setting priorities and tracking progress is serious.

### b. Outreach and Communications

*Status: Red*

The Agricultural Coordination Committee (ACC) shares information with stakeholders. However, a number of the crop-specific ACCs are weak or not functioning. The communications between the ACCs in the counties and their headquarters are poor. Any information sharing that exists tends to be donor driven, especially when a donor is working in a particular crop represented by an ACC. Stakeholders of the groups are overlapping, and some are dormant while others are active. A new website for the MOA was recently launched, but it contains limited information, and the old website is still up, which creates some confusion. However, considering the poor internet coverage of the country, information needs to be distributed in multiple formats.

### c. Private Sector Participation – Opportunity/Space

*Status: Yellow*

The private sector is included in a number of stakeholder groups including the ACC, the MOA's Program Management Unit's (PMU) steering committee, the Ministry of Finance led **Liberia Development Alliance (LDA)** working group, as well as working groups put in place by donor projects or for the development of specific policies. The ADWG is a government – donor working group without any permanent presence by private sector or civil society groups. However, the Farmers Union Network is advocating for obtaining a permanent seat. Some private sector organizations believe that there is a lot of one way communication where the private sector are bringing the issues to the table, but the government is not addressing how they can work towards

finding solutions. While the private sector seems to have gained little from working with GoL and is often frustrated, interviews suggest that the private sector keeps trying in hopes that responsiveness will improve. Considering that the MOA is top-heavy decision-making bureaucracy, these meetings are often not attended by senior government officials with the authority to drive implementation or make more systematic changes. Senior staff at the MOA recognizes this deficiency and one of the assistant ministers, who after a recent shuffle within the ministry is new in his position, intends to make participation a greater priority.

d. Private Sector Participation – Capacity to Participate

*Status: Yellow*

There is a tension between the large international concessions and the smaller local businesses. The concessions carry a lot of weight and deal with the National Investment Commission and the National Bureau of Concessions rather than the MOA. Although the private sector outside of the concessions is rather small, there are some vocal people within the sector that can advocate for their interests. However, some of these groups could become much more effective if they had a better understanding of advocacy work, the need to substantiate complaints and concerns, and how they could become a part of the solution. There are very few organizations engaged in advocacy for environmental and social sustainability with respect to the operations of large agricultural concessions and extractive industries. Consequently, these organizations are stretched very thin while operating with few resources making sustained, effective advocacy challenging

e. Participation of CSOs – Opportunity/Space

*Status: Yellow*

Other than SDI, the civil society sector is weak and poorly organized in Liberia. While SDI engages in natural resource management and land tenure issues, there is no other organization focused on agriculture and food security. There are no women's associations that are effectively engaging in advocacy work in relation to the sector. CSOs have the opportunity to participate in policy dialogue, but the sector is small and weak. Small scale farmers have largely been unrepresented until the establishment of the FUN, which is starting to take up more space and has potential, but has yet to have tangible wins.

f. Participation of CSOs – Capacity to Participate

*Status: Red*

While there are some smaller organizations on various stakeholder forums, there is a severe lack of capacity among local civil society organizations to participate and contribute to discussions on food security issues. Women's advocacy groups in the country, even the traders' union, have other focus areas, such as domestic violence rather than agriculture and food security. Despite the absence of strong women's advocacy groups in the sector, there is a certain level of gender awareness in groups such as the FUN. The FUN is actively seeking out opportunities to engage in policy dialogues, which is a promising development.

## CONCLUSIONS

Civil society organizations are just reemerging in Liberia and the sector is still weak. The civil society sector that does exist is focused on human rights, democracy and reconciliation but there's limited attention on food security and agriculture. Nevertheless, SDI is seeking to organize smaller local organizations to scrutinize palm oil concessions and its effect on the local communities. Liberia is working on the National Interpretation of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil with participation of a multi-stakeholder group. While women's associations are included in stakeholder forums, they are either not

well organized or focused on training rather advocacy. The private agricultural sector is divided between the large international concessions and medium to smaller farmers. The international concession agreements have been widely criticized for being unfavorable for the country, but they were signed right after the civil war when the government needed a lot of upfront cash and the prospects of job creation to stabilize the nation. The government has been rather defensive of the concessions and certain policies, notably the exceptions on import duties that are favorable for the concessions, but not directly for local agricultural businesses. While some of these actors have come together in the Chamber of Commerce or the RPAL, this is a significant tension that the government is attempting to navigate with no clear results one way or the other as yet

The Agricultural Coordination Committee (ACC) serves as an important tool for the MOA to engage with their stakeholders both at a national, county and district level. However, some of the technical leads within the MOA are not taking the responsibility to chair and lead an ACC, and several of the ACCs are either not meeting or are not effective. The communication between the headquarters, the counties and the districts ACC is sporadic at best. Improved two way communication would ensure that the MOA is hearing concerns and priorities from the field and that the field is getting direction and support from the headquarters.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Strengthen civil society organizations to engage and participate in advocacy and food security policy discussions.** To increase participation by the civil society in policy development and implementation, capacity building support should be provided to the sector, especially to women's advocacy organizations. The **National Democratic Institute (NDI)** of Liberia has conducted a survey of CSOs in the country and are working to enhance the capacity of a selected number of these organizations, which have promising potential to engage in advocacy. This is an opportunity to see if there is potential for some cross-fertilization to also engage these groups or others in food security policy competencies. More established organizations such as SDI will be a valuable partner in building and identifying organizations.
2. **Strengthen the organization of the Agricultural Coordination Committee.** The leadership at the MOA has expressed the need to strengthen the ACC and the recognition and willingness to provide greater leadership needs to be supported. There is also a great need to establish a feasible structure for two-way communication considering the current logistical challenges.

## POLICY ELEMENT 4: EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS

*Evidence based analysis is primarily donor driven and funded by donors. Some quality data exists but there are still large gaps. The country's research and monitoring and evaluation capacity is still weak after the civil war.*

### OVERVIEW

The civil war destroyed the infrastructure for collecting data, decimated human resources and physical records were demolished. The **Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI)**, the country's only agricultural research center, was virtually destroyed by the war. CARI's research center is now being rebuilt and master and PhD students are sent for training across Africa. With the help of the international research organizations **AfricaRice** and **International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)** mentorship and capacity building is taking place at the research station. The revitalization of CARI is an area the government takes a keen interest in, but it will continue to take considerable resources to rebuild the capacity and translate research into support for policy formulations and implementation by the extension services.

The **MOA's statistics unit** is not operating due to the lack of human capacity. Instead, the MOA has deferred its mandate to collect agricultural statistics to **Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS)**. LISGIS established an agricultural section in 2009. From 2008 until 2011 LISGIS, with the collaboration of the MOA and with the support of **Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)** and other donors, carried out annual surveys of selected crops. In 2012, information was only collected from five out of the fifteen counties and in 2013 the crop survey was not carried out due to lack of funds. There are not sufficient allocations in the national budget to carry out an agricultural survey. Therefore, whether a national agricultural survey will take place in 2014 or not depends on if external funding can be secured. Information for a consumer price index (CPI) is collected and published on a monthly basis in collaboration with the WFP, but the CPI is only covering Monrovia. The last National Household Survey was carried out in 1964. External funding has been secured to carry out a comprehensive National Household Survey and LISGIS is at an advanced stage of designing and planning for the data collection.

The **World Food Program (WFP)**, **UNICEF** and other United Nations (UN) agencies provided the MOA's **Food Security and Nutrition Program (FSNP)** and LISGIS financial and technical assistance to undertake the bi-annual Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey 2012. The survey covers all 130 districts in the country and provides detailed information on the food security and nutritional status in Liberia and the factors influencing them. The FSNP and LISGIS relied heavily on support and technical expertise from the WFP to develop the survey and manage the data collection. Although FSNP still is in need of significant capacity development, the collaboration helped the unit develop more in-house skills and expertise.

The demand for evidence based analysis is primarily coming from the donor community. The government has limited capacity and resources to undertake such analysis and up until this year budget allocations have not been result driven. New policies are based upon research and statistical analysis to the extent that such data exists, or external funds are made available for such research. The Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey 2012 is referred to in policy discussions and has helped the WFP, other donors and the MOA to focus more attention and resources in the food insecure lowland areas. However, such analysis is, to a large extent, performed by donor funded consultants as the development of new policies is heavily donor driven. The homegrown demand for evidence based analysis is limited with very restricted involvement and capacity from the private sector, the civil society or the universities.

The MOA's **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit** consists of one person funded with support by the World Bank. The unit is stretched thin and is not able to track Liberia's CAADP commitments, despite

a stated willingness to do more M& E work The donor funded projects managed by the PMU has one M&E officer per project, but the PMU is not co-located with the MOA. The MOA's M&E unit is currently developing a common M&E framework to be able to harmonize the reporting from the PMU projects. The plan will also be presented at the Agricultural Coordination Committee meeting to urge other donor funded projects to report results in a standardized format to the MOA. The MOA does not have a good overview of what donor projects are being implemented where and what kind of results they are bringing. To address this issue, the M&E unit has put forward a proposal to the agricultural donor working group to fund a Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) assessment. The SAKSS assessments is a CAADP analytical tool to establish an operational and governance structure to continuously analyze emerging issues, constraints, and challenges facing the agricultural sector and for developing a system of information generation, monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. Economic and Financial Analysis Completed as a Component of Planning:

*Status: Red*

While the LASIP, the AfT and other key policy documents include estimated implementation costs of proposed programs, there is a consensus from the government and the donor community that policies are developed with little budgetary considerations. Considering the government's limited resources, it is clear from the outset that external funding is required for implemented most of the programs. The policy documents are, therefore, seen as a tool to seek external budgetary support. In view of limited resources, the policies should prioritize interventions, but what the top priorities for funding are remains unclear.

### b. Performance Monitoring Measures and Targets Developed

*Status: Red*

The LASIP outlines specific objectives and seven categories of performance indicators including the business enabling environment, agricultural growth performance, agricultural trade performance and poverty, hunger, and food and nutrition insecurity rates. The monitoring plan is comprehensive, but the cost and logistics of generating data, locate data collected by other ministries and donors and analyze the data is a major undertaking, which the MOA's one man M& E unit is not equipped to do.

### c. Quality Data Exists for Policy Monitoring

*Status: Red*

While strides have been made to generate quality data, notably the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey 2012 and the planned National Household Survey, there are still large gaps. There is no comprehensive production data from the last couple of years and there is very limited agricultural market information. The generation of data and analysis is dependent on external funding and expertise.

### d. Quality Data is available for Policy Making

*Status: Red*

Data produced by LISGIS is available upon request from LISGIS. However, there is no centralized, easily accessed hub to find out what data exists. Users reported that some data that LISGIS stated would be available was later found to not exist; or that data was sorted in a fashion which made it less useful. LISGIS does not make its data available on-line.

### e. Inclusion of Analysis in the Policy Development Process

*Status: Yellow*

Donors are heavily involved in advancing the development of new policies. Donors have funded technical assistance to develop some of the more recent technical or crop specific (draft) policies and strategies such as the Liberia Cocoa Development Strategy. The draft policies and strategies incorporate evidence based analysis to the extent it exists, but there is a clear lack of comprehensive data. Analysis only tends to exist when a donor provides specific outside support for it. For instance, the extensive Comprehensive Assessment of the Agriculture Sector of Liberia (CAAS-Lib) 2007 supported by the GOL, the FAO, the World Bank and **International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)** contributed to the development of the NFSNS and FAPS a year later.

f. Annual Performance Measurement Report Produced and Reviewed

*Status: Red*

There is no formal review session held or report produced to review the progress of LASIP or other related policies. The MOA indicated that they are interested in launching such a review this coming year, but concrete plans have yet to be made.

g. Independent Analysis Capacity Exists

*Status: Red*

There is very limited independent capacity to analyze food security data and use the data to engage in policy discussion and advocacy. The university system is slowly recovering from the brain drain that occurred during the civil war and is primarily focused on education, while little research is carried out. Besides the Sustainable Development Institute, there is limited engagement in tracking policy implementation or undertaking independent policy analysis. Several observers reflected upon the lack of a domestic think tank that could analyze and engage in food security policy discussions.

## CONCLUSIONS

Considering the destruction of institutional and physical infrastructure as well as the low levels of spending on agriculture, agricultural sector growth targets outlined in the LASIP appear difficult to attain.<sup>11</sup> Since the war's conclusion, the MOA has not developed the capacity to undertake research and collect data to process, analyze and disseminate. National surveys such as the CASS-LIB (2007) and the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (2012) are frequently cited and have helped guide policy formulation and implementation plans. However the GOL does not have the capacity to carry out the gathering, coordination and processing of performance indicators outlined in LASIP. The performance indicators for the AfT were very quickly found to be too extensive and unmanageable and are, therefore, being trimmed down significantly. A review of the LASIP M&E system, its processes and how the LASIP indicators align with the AfT indicators is recommended.

The introduction of the **Medium Term Expenditure Review** and the more robust system for budgetary allocations through the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS)<sup>12</sup> will require more

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<sup>11</sup> CAADP Post Compact Review Liberia Technical Review Report, 2010, p.iii.

<sup>12</sup> More details can be found at <http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P109775/lr-public-financial-management-ifmis?lang=en>

planning and tracking of results. With this system in place, the line ministries will have a greater incentive to be able to demonstrate results. Budget proposals will be graded based upon how well researched and developed a proposal is, and what results they have been able to demonstrate from the previous year. It will be important to continue to support the development of evidence based analysis as the internal demand will grow. This process has been funded by the World Bank, and is intended to support ministries and not complete their budgeting work on their behalf. Consequently, demand and take up have varied across ministries, with MOH moving along relatively quickly and MOA lagging behind.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Support a SAKSS assessment.** The MOA does not have the capacity to monitor and evaluate the progress of the LASIP. A Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) assessment will analyze the constraints and help establish an operational and governance structure which is feasible for Liberia's needs and capacity.
2. **Review the LASIP Performance Indicators.** The growth and performance targets in LASIP are difficult to attain considering the realities of Liberia's human resource and budgetary constraints. A review of the indicators should be conducted as a part of the SAKSS assessment.

## POLICY ELEMENT 5: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

*National budgetary allocations for food security remain low and programmatic support is primarily coming from donors. There is limited coordination and the government's lack of a clear vision for what the priorities are hampers effective implementation.*

### OVERVIEW

The many potential projects that are identified in LASIP and the lack of a focus on what the priorities are, have created a situation where any type of agricultural project is considered to be in line with the LASIP. The absence of a high level steering committee setting priorities for what type of projects should be implemented is hampering the advancement of the sector. Instead, the government does not have a clear picture of what activities are being implemented by donor projects and there is very limited coordination in what the projects are doing and where they are being implemented.

There are very limited funds in the national budget for implementing GOL lead projects or programs. The agricultural sector is allocated about 3% of the national budget, but most of it is tied up in employee compensations and fixed costs.<sup>13</sup> The **Program Management Unit (PMU)** was established to manage and implement donor projects that are funded through the MOA.<sup>14</sup> The PMU is currently managing nine programs funded by **IFAD**, the **World Bank** and the **African Development Bank (AfDB)**. As almost all programmatic activities are financed by donors, the PMU is the main implementation unit within the MOA. The PMU is a part of the MOA, but it has a separate management structure, is better funded and is not co-located with the MOA. The PMU has an active steering committee that is meeting twice a year to review progress and vetting budget proposals related to the PMU programs.

The NFSNS foresee that a secretariat to the **Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee (FSNTC)** should be created within MOA. Although the FSNTC is not functioning, the secretariat, the **Food Security and Nutrition Program (FSNP)** operates. The secretariat is supposed to gather inter-sectoral information, analyze it and report it to the Technical Committee. The FSNP is monitoring the food security situation in the country and is well positioned to take on and serve as its intended role of a secretariat.

In line with the national decentralization process, the MOA is striving towards greater presence in the counties and the districts. However, about 70% of the budget is still spent at the headquarters, and about 75% of the staff is posted in Monrovia.<sup>15</sup> The **Agricultural County Offices (ACO)** and the **Agricultural District Offices (ADO)** have few staff members and are poorly funded. The extension services are seriously underfunded and are not able to reach the farmers. As an example, a group of farmers that recently participated in a conference on small and medium enterprise development organized by the Ministry of Commerce and Industries and the FED project had never heard about rice seed certification.

Each of the ADOs and the ACOs should be chairing agricultural coordination committees (ACC), where implementation plans can be discussed and concerns be addressed. The ACC is the main tool the MOA have to communicate with their users in the districts and counties. However, there is no strategy in place for communicating with the ACCs. Reports from the headquarters are not going out to the field and the field is not reporting back to the headquarters. The ACOs and the ADOs are faced with considerable logistical constraints and it is not easy to communicate without adequate IT support and internet

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<sup>13</sup> The number varies slightly depending on what is included in the agricultural sector. The budget is available at <https://sites.google.com/a/mopea.gov.lr/mtef-budget/>

<sup>14</sup> The PMU was established with the support of the USAID funded Technical Assistance Service Support of the MOA (TASMOA) project (2008-2011).

<sup>15</sup> USAID, Public Financial Management Rapid Assessment Framework (PFMRAF) Review of the Ministry of Agriculture, 2013 [Draft].

connection, with bad roads and limited vehicles and funds for fuel. Nevertheless, the big gap between the headquarters in Monrovia and the rest of the country is a significant impediment for effective implementation.

**The Office of the President's Program Delivery Unit (PDU)** monitors and tracks the implementation of key policy priorities. The unit has a point person for each of the five priority areas that the President has identified as the government's top priorities; the port, road infrastructure, energy, reconciliation and youth. The PDU monitor, assist and push for the implementation and completion of projects in these five priority areas. The PDU is also in close contact with the Ministry of Finance to focus the national budget to these five priority areas. Although the President is also committed to agricultural development, it has not been a leading priority in budgetary allocations. The President is primarily deferring development and implementation in the agricultural sector to the Minister of Agriculture. New this year is that the PDU is briefed on a quarterly basis by the MOA's PMU on its activities.

Launched in 2013, the **Liberia Development Alliance (LDA)** of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is designed to be the government's coordination and monitoring entity to ensure that line ministries and donor projects are aligned with the objectives of the AfT. The LDA will develop sector plans for each of the sectors such as agriculture and food security. The **Project Financial Management Unit** of the MOF will help ministries develop budgets to reflect the sector plan's priorities. The LDA will track progress in implementation and results, but have come to realize that the monitoring framework was too complicated and not feasible, and it is therefore now being revised. LDA has sector working groups, but actors from all sectors agreed that the LDA is a good idea but one that has yet to take root.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. Implementation Plans Developed

*Status: Yellow*

LASIP contains four programs and each program has a number of sub-programs with specific activities. Although many of the activities lack details ("Promote value addition activities in the food crop sub-sector.")<sup>16</sup>, the activities can be, and have been developed into funding proposals to donors. However, several observers remarked that there are so many activities within LASIP without any clear priority order that most program or project ideas can fit with LASIP. A clear vision of what the priorities are for implementing LASIP is therefore needed.

### b. System in Place to Analyze Implementation Capacity Constraints

*Status: Red*

There is no systematic plan for analyzing institutional capacity or financial constraints within the MOA. There are no clear communications or decision-making arrangements in place between the headquarters and the county and district agriculture offices. While the USAID funded Technical Assistance Service Support of the MOA (TASMOA) (2008-2011) project improved some capacity constraints, two recent assessments of the MOA highlights the acute lack of processes for identifying and addressing constraints.

### c. Food Security Policy Priorities Aligned with Work Plans of Line Ministries

*Status: Red*

The absence of a high level steering committee for agriculture and food security is negatively impacting line ministries awareness and alignment with the food security policies. Instead, cross coordination

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<sup>16</sup> Sub program 2.1.1: Food Crops Production and Productivity Enhancement, activity vii, LASIP p. 21.

between ministries takes place at an *ad hoc* basis depending on the issue and who is involved. Coordination appears to be linked to whether there is a donor project that seeks to work with multiple ministries or departments. Although some connections are made on a higher level between ministries, technical collaboration around cross-cutting themes such as nutrition between MOA extension officers and Ministry of Health workers have not taken root.

d. Policy Implementation Budget Committed by Host Country

*Status: Yellow*

The GOL appropriates about \$18 million or less than 3% of the national budget to the agricultural sector. In 2012/2013, an additional \$33 million was committed by donors (primarily IFAD and AfDB) in direct budgetary support for projects managed by the PMU. These budgetary allocations are nowhere sufficient to implement policy initiatives. Nevertheless the GOL's budget allocation has improved from the previous three years where there were no money at all allocated for GOL's projects but the whole MOA budget was tied up in employee compensation, capital expenses and goods and services. The GOL is making institutional strides in financial planning and management by introducing a three year Medium Term Expenditure Review. Up until now the MOA has not had a detailed budget plan and has not had a process to monitor planned versus actual expenditures. Moreover, up until this budget year the ministries did not have to justify their budgets. Under the Ministry of Finance's Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) line ministries are trained on how to prepare comprehensive program descriptions and budget proposals for budgetary consideration. Under the new Public Financial Management system, projects have to align with the AfT and meet certain criteria to be funded under the national budget. These changes are new and the MOA needs to undergo considerable reforms to get up to speed with the new system. The World Bank funded IFMIS program has made the national budget easily understandable and accessible online on the Liberian open budget initiative.

e. Supplemental Implementation Funds Secured

*Status: Yellow*

External funding to the agricultural sector represents several multiples of the government's spending. The GOL has with technical assistance been successful in securing funding from the **Global Agriculture Food Security Program** (GAFSP) Trust Fund. Additional budgetary support has been secured from IFAD, AfDB, the World Bank, the Japanese Trust Fund and UNDP. In addition, USAID and the government of Japan as well as a number of other donors provide significant programmatic technical assistance. This supplemental funding is implemented through international NGOs and contractors rather than the government, and is therefore harder for the government to track. Considering the numerous activities under the LASIP there is still about a  $\frac{3}{4}$  funding gap. Although nowhere near to bridge this funding gap, internal and external funds to the agricultural sector are projected to increase over the next couple of years.<sup>17</sup> Given that Liberia will likely remain resource-constrained in the coming years, the LASIP should at a minimum prioritize the issues that need to be addressed more clearly.

f. Monitoring and Evaluation

*Status: Red*

There is a low capacity in the public sector to review the impact of policy change. Reliable statistical series do not exist due to the period of conflict and the limited presence of agricultural staff in the rural areas makes regular monitoring very challenging. Certain interest groups within the private sector and the civil society sector, such as the Rubber Planters Association of Liberia and SDI, have

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<sup>17</sup> The World Bank, Liberia Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review, 2013.

some capacity to engage in discussion on the effectiveness of policy implementation. However, most of the private sector and civil society are too weak and too poorly organized to effectively engage in policy review. There is no formal sector review. The Liberia Development Alliance is seeking to coordinate, track and review the progress towards the AfT, but the structure is still new and has not gained much traction.

## CONCLUSIONS

There is no mechanism in place to use the LASIP framework to vet project proposals. The LASIP should orient the development of projects towards areas that are prioritized and should be more specific about objectives for the different counties. Instead, projects are developed by donors and justified as being in line with the LASIP broad priorities. The government does not have a good overview over what projects are being implemented and is not directing the development of new projects. There is an urgent need for the MOA to articulate what the priorities are. The adoption of an annual work plan would help the MOA to focus its work on those priorities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Establish a process for vetting and aligning projects under the LASIP.** The Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee needs to be reestablished with high level political participation and support. The FSNTC need to prioritize the goals and activities under the LASIP and establish an efficient process for vetting and aligning project proposals under the LASIP. The Food Security and Nutrition Program could coordinate or provide technical input into the process.
2. **Support the development of an annual work plan for the MOA.** The MOA is taking an interest in developing an annual work plan and this initiative needs to be supported. The work plan would help the MOA to focus and prioritize its activities, analyze constraints and coordinate initiatives with other line ministries, donor programs, the private sector or CSO.

## POLICY ELEMENT 6: MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The mutual accountability framework in Liberia is currently lacking a functioning, higher level steering committee for food security to outline priorities, coordinate initiatives and monitor progress. There is no sector wide performance review and there is currently no clear picture of how the government's and the donors' technical and financial support collectively impact food security.

### OVERVIEW

Liberia receives one of the highest levels of per capita development assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>18</sup> In 2009, the donor community spent about \$45 million in the agricultural sector, where USAID was the largest donor, followed by the EU, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the World Bank.<sup>19</sup> In 2012/2013, \$33 million was committed by donors (primarily IFAD and the AdDB) in direct budgetary support for projects managed by the PMU. The Agricultural Donor Working Group has put together a spreadsheet to share information about the projects they are funding. As the project budgets are reported for the whole project period rather than per program year, it is not easy to assess what the annual donor expenditure on the sector is. Nevertheless, it is clear that donor support is crucial to the government's expenditure on agriculture.

The newly created **Liberia Development Alliance's Steering Committee** is chaired by the President and is intended to set the overall strategic vision for the implementation of the Agenda for Transformation (AfT). Each of the AfT's five pillars has a **Pillar Committee** which meets on a quarterly basis and is chaired by a ministry. Each pillar is made up of a number of sectors; the second pillar "economic transformation" has ten sectors including "private sector development" and "increased agricultural production and greater food security". The **Sector Committees** meet on a monthly or bi-monthly basis and are co-chaired by a donor and a representative of the private sector or the SCO sector. This structure is supported by the **LDA Secretariat** at the Ministry of Finance. The LDA secretariat is charged with assuring that donor funding is in line with the AfT, which most donors are. However, it's been challenging for the LDA to track donor funding disbursed outside of the national budget and to monitor its impact is yet even more difficult. The LDA has established a robust structure, but several observers shared that although the LDA's mandate to coordinate the AfT requires a holistic approach, the LDA is too broad in its scope and is spreading itself too thin that key issues can't be moved forward.

The **Agriculture Donor Working Group** (ADWG) includes government partners, principally the MOA, and the main donors in the sector; USAID, World Bank, EU, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), AfDB, FAO, WFP and SIDA. The ADWG meet on a monthly basis to share information and coordinate activities. However, over the last year, participation from higher level representatives has been uneven and some members of the ADWG have found the sessions less useful as decisions can't be made during the meetings.

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<sup>18</sup> In 2009, the per capita official development assistance (\$134) was the 4<sup>th</sup> highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. USAID, Country Development Cooperative Strategy Liberia 2013-2017, at p. 19.

<sup>19</sup> USAID, Strategic Review Feed the Future, January 2010.

As noted elsewhere in this report, the absence of a functioning Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee to set the vision and priorities for the sector, coordinate donor and government initiatives and track progress is weakening the sector.

## **CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS**

### a. A Forum Exists for Regularly Scheduled Donor-Government Meetings

*Status: Yellow*

The Agricultural Donor Working Group (ADWG) meets on a monthly basis to share information and coordinate activities. While information is being shared, several of the members of the ADWG said that participation has dropped off and that the meetings are not as engaging and useful as they used to be.

### b. Joint Policy Priorities Developed

*Status: Yellow*

Although the GOL objectives under the LASIP and the AfT are supported by the donors, these objectives are not prioritized and not reviewed on an annual basis. A clearer articulation of the sector's policy objectives would be beneficial for donors to be able to align activities with the GOL's priorities.

### c. Monitoring System Exists

*Status: Red*

The MOA does not perform an annual sector review for food security or agriculture. The Liberia Development Alliance holds regular pillars and sector meetings, which potentially could review the performance commitments of the donors and the government. However, the buy-in into the LDA structure by some of the ministries is not yet very strong. Although the LDA has only been in place for less than a year, several observers did not find the organization particularly useful yet.

### d. Donor Coordination – Alignment and Harmonization

*Status: Yellow*

Donors are aligning their activities with the LASIP, AfT and other steering documents. However, the broad scope of the LASIP and the GOL's lack of a strategic and realistic vision for the sector with clearly articulated priorities, allows most projects to be considered to align with the government's objectives. There is no structure or system in place to gauge how well donor funded activities align with the government's policy objectives, although it is possible that the LDA will be able to play that role.

### e. Private Sector Accountability

*Status: Yellow*

The private sector is not represented on the ADWG. However, the private sector is represented on the PMU Steering committee and the ACC. Both of these forums provide an opportunity for dialogue, although some private sector actors perceive the communication to be one-sided.

### f. CSO Sector Accountability

*Status: Yellow*

The civil society sector is not represented on the ADWG. However the Farmers Union Network is lobbying to get a permanent position. The private sector is represented on the PMU Steering committee and the ACC. Both of these forums provide an opportunity for dialogue. A member

of these forums pointed out that in discussing specific projects the bigger picture of how different projects or strategies are connected was often lost.

## CONCLUSIONS

Although there is a certain level of government –donor coordination, the government needs to take greater leadership in articulating realistic priorities and provide more oversight in what development projects donors are intending to implement. There is a need to clearly map out the different donor projects and how they relate to LASIP and each other. It would therefore be beneficial for the government, the donor community, private sector and civil society to come together for an annual review.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Support the MOA to map out donor projects.** There is a need to get a better overview of the nature and the relationships between existing projects. Building upon the ADWG's spreadsheet, the system needs to be informative but easy to maintain for the M&E unit at MOA. Such a mapping exercise will prepare the MOA for an annual review session, and help the GOL to identify gaps. The overview will facilitate the MOA's implementation of a harmonized and straightforward monitoring and evaluation system to collect data from donor supported projects.
2. **Support the establishment of annual review sessions.** The MOA has expressed interest in holding an annual review session on food security and agriculture. The MOCI has shown a budding interest in agricultural marketing and the LDA would also take interest in such an event. The government's line ministries, the donor community, the private sector and the SCOs could come together to review progress and have a space to validate the government's priorities.

# CONCLUSION

Liberia is a post-conflict society with enormous needs to build the country's infrastructure, human capacity and governance structure. Unlike many other African countries, there is an abundance of fertile land and water resources. However, the input infrastructure and extension networks are weak or in some areas almost non-existent, the poor roads and electricity infrastructure results in huge post-harvest losses and there are poor market linkages. Liberia has a great potential for agricultural production but will require significant resources and a committed leadership with a clear vision for how to prioritize and coordinate initiatives and activities to move the sector forward. To accomplish greater implementation, the MOA needs to be strengthened to be able to drive the development of new policies and coordinate and oversee the implementation of existing policies. In addition, the counties and districts needs to be strengthened by improving the GOL's presence and coordination as well as putting a greater emphasize on fostering an entrepreneurial culture.

The LASIP represents an important opportunity for the GOL to move the agricultural sector forward. However, the LASIP is outlining so many possible activities that without a clear vision from the government and buy-in from the development partners, the LASIP is reduced to a catch-all justification for any sort of agricultural projects. Instead, a number of commitments and actions are required.

- 1. Demonstrate leadership in articulating LASIP priorities.**

Given the limited resources that exist, the GOL needs to clearly articulate what the main priorities are in implementing the LASIP. Currently, there is a vast list of activities under the LASIP, which in practice does not have any order of priority. The MOA need to form and make good use of the Food Security and Nutrition Technical Committee and utilize the Agricultural Donor Working Group more strategically to seek buy in from donors to align their activities with a set of priorities the government should establish after consultation with stakeholders.

- 2. Strengthen the Capacity of the MOA.** It has been made evident in two recent assessments prior to this assessment that the MOA's organizational, financial and management capacity needs to be strengthened. There is a need for the MOA to recognize that by reviewing and streamlining procedures the ministry can become more effective and donors would be more willing to provide budgetary support to the MOA. There is also a need for the MOA to review decision making structures, and identify and unlock what is blocking staff to take greater ownership and drive activities, such as the development of a new policy. There is also a great need to strengthen the agricultural sector's capacity of monitoring and evaluation.

- 3. Greater Focus on the Regions.** There is a tremendous need to increase the GOL's presence in the counties and the districts. The coordination and communication between the Headquarters and the rest of the country needs considerable improvement. While the MOA needs to have a greater presence and engagement with stakeholders in rural areas, it is clear that the government alone is not able to meet the demand for extension or marketing services. The GOL, together with development partners and stakeholders, needs to explore how they can facilitate the provision of services by encouraging and engaging the private sector in service delivery.

By ensuring these commitments, the GOL will be better positioned to advance the agricultural sector and move towards fulfilling its CAADP commitments.

# ANNEX: CAPACITY FOR POLICY CHANGE INDICATORS

- **Red:** requires significant attention to ensure the component is achieved.
- **Yellow:** Progress is mixed. The conditions required to achieve the component are partially achieved, but additional attention is required.
- **Green:** The component is realized to a sufficient degree, and additional attention to this area is not required at this time.

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
<b>Policy Element 1:</b> Predictability of the Guiding Policy Framework			
<b>Clearly Defined and Consistent Policy Framework:</b> The policy framework impacting food security policy-making is clearly defined, and consistently applied and enforced from year to year.			
<b>Predictability and Transparency of the Policy Making process:</b> The policy development process is transparent in accordance with the rules contained within the country's constitution, basic law, and elsewhere in the formal legal framework.			
<b>Clear and Functional Legislative System:</b> There is a legislative capacity to deal with food security policy change, and the legislative requirements are clearly defined and predictable.			
<b>Appropriate Dispute Resolution Process/Judicial Framework:</b> The judicial system is perceived as fair and effective, and there is an appropriate system for dispute resolution where conflicts arise relating to food security policy.			
<b>Clearly defined Institutional Responsibilities:</b> Institutional responsibilities are clearly defined, consistently applied, and predictable from year to year.			
<b>Policy Element 2:</b> Policy Development & Coordination			
<b>Approved Food Security Strategy/Investment Plan:</b> There is an approved/official multi-sectoral, multi-year food security plan developed, which specifies priorities and objectives, and addresses the roles of various contributors, including across government, the private sector, and CSOs. The vision and strategy to improve food security is clear.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
<b>Predictable Policy Agenda and Priorities Developed:</b> The policy items required to achieve the national food strategy have been identified and documented, i.e., specific policy objectives exist.			
<b>Work Plans:</b> There is an annual work plan that identifies objectives and activities in regard to policy development.			
<b>Coordination Process:</b> There is an entity, such as a coordination unit or task force, that has defined membership and meets regularly to discuss, develop and coordinate food security policy development (and oversee cross-sector coordination).			
<b>Secretariat/Administrative Support Function:</b> There is an adequate staff capability to perform required support processes, including coordination, meeting management, communication, and document management. This may be a stand-alone secretariat, or a responsibility within an existing entity.			
<b>Technical Capacity:</b> There are work groups, or technical committees, that have the authority and capacity to perform the following functions: identify policy and technical challenges/issues, develop sector- or project-specific policies/strategies, consult within the sector and draft funding proposals. There should be active participation by the private sector and CSOs on the technical work groups (as appropriate).			
<b>Political Support and Approval:</b> There is a line of authority/participation by high-level decision-makers above the ministerial level so as to enable efficient political support for the passage and development of new policies, e.g. involvement of prime minister's office (especially for policies that cut across sectors, e.g. trade and agriculture).			
<b>Engagement of Parliament/Legislative Body:</b> There is engagement from the country's legislative entity to debate and engage on food security issues, and to sponsor and advocate for the required legal/policy changes.			
<b>Policy Element 3: Inclusivity and Stakeholder Consultation</b>			
<b>Inclusive Participation within the Policy Coordination Management Entity:</b> The main coordination entity has: a) clear goals and participation from key government ministries (beyond just Ministry of Agriculture) and; b) some representation from non-government entities, particularly from donors.			
<b>Outreach and Communications:</b> There is a process for interacting with stakeholders and sharing information. This could include regular public "forums", a website of key information and other mechanisms.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
<b>Private Sector Participation – Opportunity/Space:</b> The private sector is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.			
<b>Private Sector Participation – Capacity to Participate:</b> Some organizations representing the private sector have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food security policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.			
<b>Participation of CSOs – Opportunity/Space:</b> The CSO sector, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, is provided meaningful opportunity to participate in policy formulation and strategy discussions. This could be through participation in the management/steering committee, in technical work groups and/or through other forums. Communications and interactions should be two-way, and access to key information should be readily available.			
<b>Participation of CSOs – Capacity to Participate:</b> Some organizations representing civil society, including representation from women’s associations and farmers associations, have the capacity to participate in government-led discussions on food security policy. This is to say they are able to represent their members, they are able to articulate and communicate policy positions, and they are able to provide some level of evidence-based analysis to support their viewpoints.			
<b>Policy Element 4: Evidence-based Analysis</b>			
<b>Economic and Financial Analysis Completed as a Component of Planning:</b> National food security priority policy initiatives/investment plans are based on economic and financial analysis, including independent policy analysis. The analysis is available for public review.			
<b>Performance Monitoring Measures and Targets Developed:</b> The national food security policies/plans include specific objectives, performance indicators, and targets exist to monitor the accomplishment of the objectives.			
<b>Quality Data Exists for Policy Monitoring:</b> There is a database of quality statistics that is used to routinely report and analyze progress in achieving objectives. (Analysis to be conducted by USDA – and not as part of this assessment framework.)			
<b>Quality Data is Available for Policy Making:</b> Data on the performance of the agriculture sector and the food security are publically available and shared in a timely manner. This information is available for others to use and analyze.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
<b>Inclusion of Analysis in the Policy Development Process:</b> Evidence-based analysis is considered and used to develop policy priorities/policy proposals.			
<b>Annual Performance Measurement Report Produced and Reviewed:</b> Evidence-based analysis is produced to review policy effectiveness (for implemented policies). A formal review session is held, and includes key development partners (including principal donors and multilateral partners, such as FAO and IFPRI). Recommendations are developed as a result of the review and incorporated into subsequent plans.			
<b>Independent Analysis Capacity Exists:</b> There exists an independent capacity to analyze food security data and use the analysis to make policy recommendations and engage in policy discussion and advocacy. Such an analysis could be conducted by a research institute, university or similar non-governmental/objective organization. This capacity should be engaged in the government's policy development and review process as, for example, through papers, forums or participation introduced in official policy review and discussion meetings.			
<b>Policy Element 5: Policy Implementation</b>			
<b>Implementation Plans Developed:</b> The overall food security strategy has been broken down into programs and projects that have: a) a sufficient level of detail to permit implementation; b) have been “packaged” into priority projects that can be managed by ministerial units; and 3) “packaged” priorities can be translated into funding proposals to gain support for projects/programs from development partners (to address financing gaps).			
<b>System in Place to Analyze Implementation Capacity Constraints:</b> An analysis of institutional, workforce, system and financial constraints is conducted. Critical implementation constraints are identified; a work plan is developed to address constraints; and implementation actions are moved forward (and periodically reviewed).			
<b>Food Security Policy Priorities Aligned with Work Plans of Line Ministries:</b> The priority policy and associated objectives of the national food security strategy are broken down into specific programs and projects (with a sufficient level of detail) so that policy actions can be implemented by line ministries. The plans of individual ministries, and units within ministries, align with overall national strategy and its policy objectives.			

Capacity of Policy Change Indicators	Status		
			
<b>Policy Implementation Budget Committed by Host Country:</b> Resources are committed by the host country to implement the identified policy agenda. Over time, the country’s budget is adjusted to provide adequate financing for the implementation of actions required to implement policy priorities. Budget documents, including budget proposals, are released fully and in a timely manner.			
<b>Supplemental Implementation Funds Secured:</b> Proposals can be submitted, and funds secured, to address financing gaps. Funds may come from multilateral funds (such as GAFSP), regional organizations, bilateral donors and the private sector.			
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation:</b> Capacity exists within the public sector, private sector, or civil society to review the effectiveness and impact of policy changes. Sector reviews are performed and other research evidence is collected. There is a system to share, store, and access the findings from these reviews.			
<b>Policy Element 6: Mutual Accountability</b>			
<b>A Forum Exists for Regularly Scheduled Donor-Government Meetings:</b> These meetings discuss policy and programs and set priorities. Meetings may include, for example, Joint Sector Reviews, sector working groups or other similar arrangements.			
<b>Joint Policy Priorities Developed:</b> A document exists that articulates the shared policy objectives between the government and the donor community.			
<b>Monitoring System Exists:</b> Performance measures exist (for the performance commitments of the government and for the performance commitments of the donors). There is a schedule for reviewing and documenting progress – at least on an annual basis.			
<b>Donor Coordination – Alignment and Harmonization:</b> There is a process for donor participation in the food security policy process and for aligning government and donor objectives and priorities. Donor programs should contribute directly to host country strategies, plans, and objectives. This may include the signing of cooperation frameworks that indicate a joint commitment to specific policy change goals.			
<b>Private Sector Accountability:</b> The government provides feedback to the private sector on the performance of the food security program (including the private sector’s role) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.			
<b>CSO Sector Accountability:</b> The government provides feedback to the CSO sector on the performance of the food security program (including the role of CSOs) and provides an opportunity for dialogue on the program and its performance.			